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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett *
Val Leppert **
and Lauren Newman ***
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2020 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit1 issued several important and precedential opinions on a number
of evidentiary topics. For example, in four published opinions, the court
considered whether certain evidence was “testimonial” to determine
whether its admission would implicate the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause.2 The court also addressed whether a defendant on
federal supervised release faces a “classic penalty situation,” thereby
deeming any confession compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
when a probation officer asks him to answer questions that would reveal
he had committed new crimes.3
The Eleventh Circuit additionally issued several opinions concerning
lay witness and expert testimony. In five published opinions, the court
affirmed the district courts’ categorization of testimony as admissible
* Partner, King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., 1989); University
of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992). Member, State Bars of Georgia and
Florida.
** Partner, King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Westminster College (B.A., 2004);
Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2010). Member, State Bars of
Georgia and Florida.
*** Associate, King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University (B.A., 2012);
Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude, 2019). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of evidentiary topics during the prior survey period, see W. Randall
Bassett, Val Leppert & Elijah T. Staggers, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 71 MERCER
L. REV. 1021 (2020).
2 United States v. Melgen, 967 F.3d 1250, 1261 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ruan,
966 F.3d 1101, 1153 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Clotaire, 963 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2020); United States v. Santos, 947 F.3d 711, 727–29 (11th Cir. 2020).
3 McKathan v. United States, 969 F.3d 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2020).
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under Rule 7014 as lay witness testimony.5 Regarding the admissibility
of expert opinions, the court in three cases followed its trend of deferring
to the district courts on the use or exclusion of expert testimony,
affirming all three in published opinions.6
The court also issued several opinions balancing Rule 401’s7 relevancy
requirement against Rule 403’s8 grant of discretion to exclude relevant
evidence where “its probative value is substantially outweighed” by,
among other things, unfair prejudice or a likelihood of confusion.9
Although the court has long recognized that Rule 403 is “an
extraordinary remedy that the court should invoke sparingly,”10 it
nonetheless excluded evidence under the rule in two published opinions
this term.11 The court also addressed the Rules’ prohibition against
character evidence12 and hearsay in several published opinions.13 This
survey of the Eleventh Circuit’s 2020 opinions on evidentiary issues
summarizes all of these rulings and provides the practitioner with a
concise overview of the most important developments to the law of
evidence.

FED. R. EVID. 701.
United States v. Estrada, 969 F.3d 1245, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Chalker, 966 F.3d 1177, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2020); Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1298; United States
v. McLellan, 958 F.3d 1110, 1114–15 (11th Cir. 2020); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
3.921 Acres of Land in Lake Cty. Fla., 947 F.3d 1362, 1368–69 (11th Cir. 2020).
6 United States v. Gayden, 977 F.3d 1146, 1153 (11th Cir. 2020); Crawford v. ITW Food
Equip. Grp., LLC, 977 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d
1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2020).
7 FED. R. EVID. 401.
8 FED. R. EVID. 403.
9 McLellan, 958 F.3d at 1115; Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1273; United States v. McGregor,
960 F.3d 1319, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2020); Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 975 F.3d
1112, 1121–22 (11th Cir. 2020).
10 United States v. Wilson, 823 F. App’x 712, 717 (11th Cir. 2020).
11 See Sowers, 975 F.3d at 1121–22 (excluding evidence of husband’s adultery as
unnecessarily prejudicial); Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1273 (excluding evidence of compliance
with regulations on grounds that its potential for confusing the jury substantially
outweighed any minimal relevance).
12 United States v. Graham, 981 F.3d 1254, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020); Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1274–75.
13 Joseph, 978 F.3d at 1265; United States v. Amede, 977 F.3d 1086, 1097–98 (11th Cir.
2020); Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1275–76; Mamani v. Sánchez Bustamenta, 968 F.3d 1216,
1242–44 (11th Cir. 2020); Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1150–51; Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1293; United
States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1291 (11th Cir. 2020); Santos, 947 F.3d at 724.
4
5
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
A. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”14 In Crawford v. Washington,15 the Supreme Court of the
United States interpreted the clause as barring the admission of
“[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial,” unless, “the
declarant is unavailable” and the defendant “had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine” the declarant.16 The Supreme Court declined to define
with particularity what a “testimonial” statement is but identified a “core
class” of testimonial materials including “affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions,” as well as “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”17
Since Crawford, the Supreme Court has clarified the difference between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements by focusing on the “primary
purpose” of the questioning that elicited the out-of-court statement.18
Statements are nontestimonial “when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.”19 Statements are testimonial, however,
“when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”20
In four published opinions this term,21 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether certain public records, business records, and summaries of
records, were testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation

U.S. Const. amend. VI.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
16 Id. at 59; see also Santos, 947 F.3d at 727 (noting the Supreme Court in Crawford
“held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the introduction of out-of-court testimonial
statements unless the declarant is unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant”).
17 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52; see also Santos, 947 F.3d at 727–28.
18 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Melgen, 967 F.3d at 1261; Ruan, 966 F.3d 1101 at 1153; Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1295–
96; Santos, 947 F.3d at 729–30.
14
15
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Clause. In United States v. Santos,22 the defendant—a native of the
Dominican Republic—applied for naturalization.23 As part of this
process, he completed an N-400 Application for Naturalization, “which is
a standard form that all individuals must submit to the government to
become a naturalized citizen.”24 In a section titled “Good Moral
Character,” the defendant certified under penalty of perjury that he had
never been arrested, charged with a crime, convicted of a crime, or been
in jail or prison.25 Roughly a year-and-a-half later, a United States
Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) officer interviewed the
defendant.26 During the interview, the officer annotated the N-400 form
in red ink, writing comments such as “claims no arrest[,] no offense[,] no
DUI” under the defendant’s answers, and then signed the Application.27
At the end of the interview, the defendant swore under penalty of perjury
that the contents of the Application, including the officer’s annotations,
were true and correct.28
The question before the court in Santos was whether the district
court’s introduction of the N-400 Application for Naturalization,
including the USCIS officer’s annotations, violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause. Relying on a case
from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,29 the court
concluded that it did not.30 The court reasoned that all naturalization
applicants are required to complete a Form N-400 Application and that
USCIS officers perform the same verification process in every
naturalization interview.31 Moreover, “USCIS officers are not conducting
the interviews because they suspect the applicants of crimes and are not
making the red marks on the Form N-400 for later criminal
prosecution.”32 The court therefore determined that the defendant’s
annotated Form N-400 Application was a “nontestimonial public record
produced as a matter of administrative routine” and “for the primary
purpose of determining [the defendant’s] eligibility for naturalization.”33
Because the red marks on the annotated Form N-400 Application were
947 F.3d 711 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 716.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 716–17.
28 Id. at 717.
29 See United States v. Phoeun Lang, 672 F.3d 17, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2012).
30 Santos, 947 F.3d at 729.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. (citation omitted).
22
23
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nontestimonial, the court concluded that their admission could not
violate the Confrontation Clause.34
In United States v. Ruan,35 the court addressed the question of
whether the admission of data from Alabama’s Prescription Database
Monitoring Program (PDMP) violated the defendants’ Sixth Amendment
rights under the Confrontation Clause.36 The court first observed that
“certain statements by their nature are not testimonial—for example,
business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”37 Because
the court determined the PDMP reports were business records, it found
that “they [we]re not testimonial and d[id] not violate the Confrontation
Clause.”38 The court additionally noted, however, that even if the reports
were not business records, they would nonetheless be nontestimonial. It
reasoned that “[p]harmacists are required by law to enter the PDMP data
for the primary purpose of aiding physicians in treating patients, such as
combating addiction.”39 “[T]he fact that the pharmacists may be aware
when they input the data that law enforcement also has access to the
database if needed during an investigation does not transform the data
entry into the type of formal statement required for testimonial
evidence.”40 The court therefore affirmed the district court’s admission of
the PDMP data, concluding it was not implicated by the Confrontation
Clause.
In United States v. Clotaire,41 the court addressed the applicability of
the Confrontation Clause to another business record.42 In Clotaire, the
district court admitted screenshots of ATM surveillance footage pursuant
to Rules 803(6)43 and 902(11)44 under the records of regularly conducted
business activity.45 The defendant objected to this evidence, arguing “that
the person who pulled still frames from the video surveillance [footage
was] a witness against him and [] he therefore had the right to confront
the methods used to produce the images and the opportunity to crossexamine someone with knowledge of how the exhibits were created."46
Id.
966 F.3d 1101 (11th Cir. 2020).
36 Id. at 1153.
37 Id. (citation and internal marks omitted).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 963 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2020).
42 Id. at 1295–96.
43 FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
44 FED. R. EVID. 902(11).
45 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1294.
46 Id.
34
35
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The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding that “[s]till frame pictures are
not statements at all, let alone testimonial ones.”47 It observed that
“pictures are not witnesses[,]” “[s]urveillance cameras are not witnesses,
and surveillance photos are not statements.”48 The court additionally
expressed skepticism at the defendant’s suggestion that the photos were
somehow “enhanced.”49 The court determined that even if they had
undergone some “post-capture processing for clarity,” any such
processing would not make them testimonial, because the photo
processor did nothing more than get the clearest image.50 “[S]he made no
assertion about what the image showed or who it might be.”51 Because
the surveillance photos nor their purported enhancement constituted
statements, much less testimonial ones, the court affirmed the district
court’s admission of the ATM surveillance photos.52
Although the Eleventh Circuit ultimately found the business records
in Ruan and Clotaire nontestimonial and therefore they did not implicate
the Confrontation Clause, the court’s analysis varied slightly between
the cases. In Ruan, the Eleventh Circuit found the PDMP data
nontestimonial because it was a business record.53 It cited United States
v. Wilson54 and United States v. Naranjo55 for the proposition that
business records are categorically nontestimonial and therefore not
implicated by the Confrontation Clause.56 Both Wilson and Naranjo cited
Crawford for support.57 However, the Eleventh Circuit in Clotaire
expressly rejected any such categorical approach.58 In a footnote at the
end of the opinion, the court stressed that its conclusion that the ATM
surveillance photos were nontestimonial “does not—and cannot—rest on

Id. at 1295.
Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1296.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1153 (“Because the PDMP reports are business records as
explained above, they are not testimonial and do not violate the Confrontation Clause.”).
54 788 F.3d 1298, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Certain statements ‘by their nature [are] not
testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.’”
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56)).
55 634 F.3d 1198, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Business records are not testimonial.”
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56)).
56 Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1153.
57 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that
by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy.”).
58 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1295 n.4.
47
48
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[its] determination that the ATM photographs [we]re business records.”59
It reasoned that the Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts60 that business records “are generally admissible absent
confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay
rules, but because—having been created for the administration of an
entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”61 The court therefore observed
that the proper inquiry is not whether evidence qualifies for admission
under an exception to the hearsay rule, but whether the evidence is
testimonial.62 These cases combined suggest that although business
records are generally nontestimonial under Crawford, certain business
records may still run afoul of the Confrontation Clause if they are
testimonial in nature.63
In United States v. Melgen,64 the Eleventh Circuit considered the
applicability of the Confrontation Clause to summaries of data.65 There,
the defendant was charged with operating a multi-year scheme to
defraud Medicare.66 At trial, the district court allowed the introduction
of summary charts under Rule 100667 that compared the defendantphysician’s billing to the billing of peer physicians.68 The defendant was
ultimately found guilty. He appealed his conviction arguing, among other
things, that the summary charts were testimonial hearsay in violation of
the Confrontation Clause.69 He specifically argued “that the mere act of
choosing selection criteria to decide which doctors’ data to include in the

Id.
557 U.S. 305 (2009).
61 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1295 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069, 1079 (8th Cir. 2013) (observing that
“most business records under Rule 803(6) are non-testimonial statements to which the
Confrontation Clause does not apply” but acknowledging that some may still violate the
Confrontation Clause if they are testimonial in nature); United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d
1204, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Crawford and Melendez-Diaz for proposition that a
statement’s admission may violate the Confrontation Clause, even if it qualifies for an
exception to the hearsay doctrine, if it constitutes testimonial hearsay).
64 967 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020).
65 Id. at 1260–61.
66 Id. at 1255.
67 Rule 1006 states: “The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove
the content of voluminous writings, recordings or photographs that cannot be conveniently
examined in court. The proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for
examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And the
court may order the proponent to produce them in court.” FED. R. EVID. 1006.
68 Melgen, F.3d at 1260.
69 Id.
59
60
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summary comparisons was a testimonial act” and therefore he had the
right to cross-examine whoever selected the criteria.70 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the admission of the summary charts.71 First, it
observed that the summaries were compiled from nontestimonial
Medicare records and thus did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.72
The court also determined that the defendant’s argument “ha[d] no basis
in our law.”73 “Attorneys routinely make decisions about which evidence
they believe is relevant to establishing a particular point,” such as “which
witnesses to call, or as here, which summaries to enter into evidence.”74
The court concluded that although the Confrontation Clause certainly
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, “[i]t does not reach back a step further to demand
the opportunity to cross-examine an attorney over why they decided to
call a particular witness—or, as in this case, about why they chose
specific selection criteria in compiling the summary.”75
B. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
More commonly known as the right against self-incrimination, the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that
“[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”76 The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he essence
of this basic constitutional principle is the requirement that the State
which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple,
cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.”77 A violation of the Fifth
Amendment occurs when “the accused is compelled to make a testimonial
communication that is incriminating.”78 If an individual is compelled to
answer an incriminating question, “his answers are inadmissible against
him in a later criminal prosecution.”79
To succeed under a Fifth Amendment challenge on a motion to
suppress a confession, a movant must show three things: “(1) that the

Id. at 1261.
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 U.S. Const. amend. V.
77 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (citation, internal marks, and emphasis
omitted).
78 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
79 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (citation omitted).
70
71
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government compelled him to make a (2) testimonial communication or
act and (3) that the testimonial communication or act incriminated
him.”80 During its 2020 term, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the first
element and considered whether a defendant who was on federal
supervised release was compelled to incriminate himself when his
probation officer asked him to answer questions that would reveal he had
committed new crimes.81 In McKathan v. United States,82 the defendant,
McKathan, completed a prison term for possession of child pornography
in 2007, after which “he began living under the terms of his supervised
release.”83 “One of those terms required McKathan to answer truthfully
all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the
probation officer.”84 In 2014, McKathan’s probation officer became
concerned about him and conducted a surprise visit at his apartment to
investigate. At the apartment, the probation officer reviewed McKathan’s
phone’s internet browser history and asked if he had been viewing child
pornography. McKathan answered that he had. Based on the probation
officer’s testimony, the court revoked McKathan’s supervised release and
sent him back to prison.85
Separate from his supervised release revocation, a federal grand jury
also, under violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(4)(B),86 charged McKathan
with three counts of knowingly possessing material containing an image
of child pornography. McKathan’s counsel filed a motion to suppress,
arguing that the government had obtained McKathan’s statements and
the fruits of the browser history through an illegal search in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The motion, however, was unsuccessful.87
Having lost his suppression motion, McKathan pled guilty to one count
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A)88 for knowingly receiving child
pornography.89
In November 2015, McKathan filed a pro se habeas petition to vacate,
set aside, or correct his conviction, arguing that his counsel had been
constitutionally deficient because they did not assert a Fifth Amendment

McKathan v. United States, 969 F.3d 1213, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id.
82 Id. at 1213.
83 Id. at 1218.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1218–19.
86 18. U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(4)(B) (2018).
87 McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1219.
88 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2018).
89 McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1220.
80
81
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argument to suppress his statements to his probation officer.90 To
succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
establish that “(1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) his
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”91 Under the
prejudice prong, the court considers whether “a reasonable likelihood
exists that the suppression issue the attorney did not advance would
have affected the outcome of the case.”92 The court therefore turned to
the merits of the underlying Fifth Amendment issue.93
Ordinarily, to invoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment, “an
individual must actually invoke the right not to make statements, or his
answers will not qualify as ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the
Amendment.”94 But the Supreme Court has determined that “when the
government denies an individual a ‘free choice’ to either speak or remain
silent, the Fifth Amendment is considered ‘self-executing,’ and an
individual need not expressly invoke the right for his statements to be
suppressed in a later criminal proceeding.”95 The court observed that the
Supreme Court has identified only three “self-executing” circumstances:
(1) custodial settings, unless the speaker has knowingly and intelligently
waived the privilege;96 (2) extremely limited tax-return-filing
circumstances;97 and (3) when the government creates a “classic penalty
situation.”98 The court found only the last exception relevant and
therefore turned to the question of whether a federal probation officer’s
questioning constitutes a “classic penalty situation.”99
The Eleventh Circuit answered in the affirmative, finding that a
reasonable person in McKathan’s position would have believed that an
invocation of the Fifth Amendment could result in revocation of his
supervised release.100 First, the court examined the precise terms of
McKathan’s supervised-release conditions, finding they did not weigh in
his favor.101 Although the conditions required McKathan to answer his
probation officer’s questions truthfully, they did not expressly condition

Id.
Id. at 1222 (citation and internal marks omitted).
92 Id. at 1223.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1224 (citation and internal marks omitted).
95 Id.
96 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–69 (1966).
97 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48–49 (1968).
98 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
99 McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1228.
100 Id. at 1226–28.
101 Id. at 1226.
90
91
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supervised release on a waiver of Fifth Amendment privilege.102 The
court then considered whether there was any reasonable basis for
McKathan to have thought that invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege
would result in the revocation of his supervised release.103 To do so, the
court turned to precedent and looked at whether the government had
successfully attempted to revoke supervised release in any case in the
Eleventh Circuit, “merely because the supervised releasee invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege.”104
In United States v. Robinson,105 the court found such precedent.106 The
court determined that “a reasonable person in McKathan’s position
would understand Robinson to authorize punishment for a supervised
releasee’s refusal to answer his probation officer’s questions.”107 Because
the court found that McKathan’s statements were made under a “classic
penalty situation,” it concluded that the government would be well within
its rights to use the statements to revoke McKathan’s supervised release,
but it could not use them to prosecute him for a new crime.108 For these
reasons, the court concluded that there was a “reasonable likelihood that
a Fifth Amendment suppression motion would have been successful.”109

Id.
Id.
104 Id. at 1226–27.
105 893 F.2d 1244 (11th Cir. 1990).
106 McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1227. In Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s revocation of a releasee’s probation when—in response to his probation officer
asking about a source of income—the releasee invoked his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. Robinson, 893 F.2d. at 1245.
107 McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1228.
108 Id. at 1229. The court presented two other bases for its holding. First, it cited an
opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that had reached the
same conclusion. See United States v. Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005). The
court also considered the fact that in the wake of opinions like Robinson, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission felt the need “to clarify that defendants should not be punished for
failing to truthfully answer their probation officer’s questions if the failure resulted from
an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1230. Because
McKathan answered his probation officer’s questions before the Sentencing Commission
promulgated this amendment, the court determined the amendment would not be
controlling. Id.
109 McKathan, 969 F.3d at 1231. The court vacated the district court’s denial of
McKathan’s § 2255 motion and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1233.
102
103
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III. WITNESS OPINION TESTIMONY
A. Expert Testimony
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness’s opinion testimony
“is classified as either lay testimony or expert testimony.”110 Under Rule
702,111 federal courts assess the admissibility of expert testimony.112
Pursuant to that rule, the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of
showing that “the expert is qualified regarding the matter at hand,
employs a reliable methodology, and will provide testimony that assists
the trier of fact to understand the issue.”113 The Supreme Court set forth
the standard for analyzing whether an expert’s methodology is reliable
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.114 Under this standard,
known as the Daubert standard,115 the court considers: “(1) whether the
expert’s testimony can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential
rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.”116
In the 2020 term, the court published three opinions addressing
challenges under the Daubert standard, deferring to the district court’s
decision in each one. In United States v. Pon,117 the defendant, an
ophthalmologist, was charged with health care fraud.118 As a part of his
scheme, he would diagnose patients with a debilitating and incurable eye
disease known as wet age-related macular degeneration (WMD) and then
move to the “treatment” phase, “which involved lasering one or both of
the patient’s eyes.”119 But other doctors who also treated the defendant’s
patients grew skeptical of this technique.120 One doctor, who saw one of
the defendant’s patients after receiving this “treatment,” did not see
WMD in either of the patient’s eyes.121 After another doctor, Dr.
Williams, referred some of his patients to the defendant, every patient
went back to Dr. Williams with a WMD diagnosis and no sign that the

McLellan, 958 F.3d at 1114.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
112 Id.
113 ITW Food, 977 F.3d at 1338.
114 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
115 See Gayden, 977 F.3d at 1153.
116 ITW Food, 977 F.3d at 1338.
117 963 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2020).
118 Id. at 1212, 1215.
119 Id. at 1212.
120 Id. at 1213.
121 Id.
110
111
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defendant had lasered their eyes in a way that would actually treat
WMD. After federal law enforcement officers executed a search warrant
and seized the defendant’s patient files, an expert determined that
maybe five to ten of the 500 patients whom the defendant had diagnosed
with WMD actually had any form of macular degeneration.122
The indictment alleged that the defendant committed fraud by falsely
diagnosing patients and using those false diagnoses for a basis of
submitting Medicare reimbursement claims. Before trial, the defendant
“notified the government that he intended to offer the expert testimony
of Giorgio Dorin, a former director of development at the company that
manufactured the ‘laser’ used by the defendant.”123 Dorin’s proposed
testimony boiled down to two main points: (1) the general concepts of
lasers and their application to eye disease; and (2) the “newer method” of
treating WMD that the defendant claimed to have used on his patients
known as “subthreshold micropulse laser photostimulation.”124 The
government moved to exclude Dorin’s proposed testimony under Daubert,
arguing that subthreshold micropulse laser photostimulation is not a
scientifically or medically valid treatment for WMD. At the end of a
three-day Daubert hearing, the court ruled that Dorin could testify about
the general concepts of lasers and their applications, but he could not
offer his opinion that subthreshold micropulse laser photostimulation
could treat WMD.125
At trial, the defendant was found guilty. He appealed his conviction
arguing that the district court should have allowed his expert to testify
about the use of subthreshold micropulse photostimulation as a
treatment for WMD.126 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
exclusion of the expert’s testimony.127 It began its discussion by
underscoring the standard of review, stating “[i]t is not easy to persuade
a court of appeals to reverse a district court’s judgment on Daubert
grounds.”128 In fact, the deference the appellate court shows “trial courts
on evidentiary rulings is especially pronounced in the Daubert context,
where the abuse of discretion standard places a ‘heavy thumb’—‘really a
thumb and a finger or two’—‘on the district court’s side of the scale.’”129
The court then determined that three of the four Daubert factors weighed

Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1215.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1215–16.
126 Id. at 1219
127 Id. at 1221.
128 Id.
129 Id. (citation omitted).
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against the reliability, and therefore the admissibility, of Dorin’s theory
that subthreshold micropulse laser photostimulation can be used to treat
WMD.130 First, the court determined that although Dorin testified his
theory could be tested, it had not been.131 Defense counsel conceded that
“Dorin [was] drawing conclusions that ha[d] not . . . been scientifically
tested.”132 Second, the defendant “failed to provide evidence about the
theory’s known or potential rate of error and whether any standards
exist[ed] to control for error.”133 Third, the court determined that Dorin’s
theory was “not generally accepted in the ophthalmology field.”134 That
left only one factor in favor of reliability: Dorin’s peer-reviewed paper
mentioning this theory.135 But the court concluded that “publication
alone is not enough to conclude that a district court abused its discretion
in not admitting expert testimony.”136
The court additionally considered a fifth factor articulated by the
Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Joiner:137 whether there is an
“analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”138 At the
Daubert hearing, “Dorin suggested that because a study showed
subthreshold micropulse laser treatment [could] treat diabetic macular
edema, his theory that it could treat WMD [was] sound.”139 But the court
stated that was a “leap from an accepted scientific premise to an
unsupported one.”140 Instead of “bridging that gap, Dorin tried to ipse
dixit over it; but a bald assertion cannot carry the Daubert burden.”141
The court therefore concluded that the district court’s exclusion of Dorin’s
testimony regarding subthreshold micropulse photostimulation “was not
an abuse of discretion but a proper exercise of the ‘considerable leeway’
the court had.”142
In Crawford v. ITW Food Equipment Group, LLC,143 the Eleventh
Circuit again affirmed a district court’s Daubert decision.144 There, the
Id. at 1220.
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
138 Pon, 963 F.3d at 1220.
139 Id. at 1221.
140 Id. (citation and internal marks omitted).
141 Id.
142 Id. (citation omitted).
143 977 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2020).
144 Id. at 1340.
130
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plaintiff sued ITW Food Equipment Group LLC, (FEG) for negligent
product design after his arm was amputated when it came into contact
with an unguarded blade of one of FEG’s commercial meat saws. To
support his case, the plaintiff introduced the expert testimony of a
professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering who was an expert in
saw and guard design. The professor designed and built an alternative
meat saw that employed a self-deploying blade guard. At the close of trial,
FEG moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing—among other
things—that the professor’s expert testimony was inadmissible. The
district court disagreed, finding the expert’s testimony regarding the
alternative design satisfied the Daubert standard.145
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.146
FEG argued that the professor did not sufficiently test whether his
design would function similarly to FEG’s meat saw or whether his design
would be purchased by users.147 The court determined that these issues
were objections going to the weight of the testimony, not objections to its
admissibility.148 Of the four Daubert factors, FEG’s main objection was a
failure to test.149 But FEG was silent as to what the professor should have
done differently.150 Despite FEG’s arguments to the contrary, the court
found that the professor had adequately tested his design.151 He applied
for a patent, submitted the model for peer review in the American
Journal of Mechanical Engineering, and demonstrated the operation of
the model in a video before the jury.152 FEG also failed to cite any case
law suggesting that consumer surveys or commercial analyses of an
alternative product design were required before evidence of that design
could be admitted.153 For these reasons, the court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting FEG’s challenge to
the plaintiff’s expert testimony.154
In United States v. Gayden,155 the Eleventh Circuit faced the issue of
whether expert testimony that is subject to confirmation bias should be
excluded under Daubert.156 In Gayden, the government sought to
Id. at 1336–38.
Id. at 1340.
147 Id. at 1339.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1340.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1341.
155 977 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2020).
156 Id. at 1153.
145
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introduce an expert witness to testify that Gayden had overprescribed
controlled substances.157 Gayden argued, however, that the expert had
reviewed “irrelevant inflammatory information about Gayden before
forming his opinion,” rendering it unreliable.158 The court disagreed,
observing that all persons are subject to the potential for confirmation
bias.159 The court also found that the district court properly determined
that any such bias “was appropriate fodder for cross-examination.”160
Although the court recognized that defense counsel would face a difficult
tactical decision at trial because asking the expert about any bias in
formulating his opinion would necessarily elicit information that could
harm Gayden, it determined this was “not the kind of Hobson’s choice
that [would] mandate[] striking the expert from testifying.”161
Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the expert to testify.162
In addition to determining whether an expert’s methodology is reliable
under Daubert, district courts must also determine whether the expert is
qualified to testify.163 The proponent of expert testimony “must show that
the expert is qualified based on her ‘knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.’”164 The defendants in Ruan, discussed supra at
Section II.A, were board-certified doctors specializing in pain
management.165 The indictment against them alleged that their medical
clinic was essentially a “pill mill” that prescribed controlled substances
for no legitimate medical purpose.166 The defendants were charged with
a slew of crimes including conspiracy to distribute controlled substances,
conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substances Act, conspiracy to commit
health care fraud, and illegal drug distribution.167 At trial, one of the
government’s medical experts, Dr. Aultman, “testified that prescribing
drugs based on one’s own financial interest is outside the usual course of
professional practice.”168 Dr. Aultman also reviewed several patients’

Id.
Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1161.
165 Id. at 1121.
166 Id. at 1120.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1123.
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files and opined that the defendants’ treatment of those individuals did
not meet the usual course of professional practice standard.169
The defendants argued on appeal that Dr. Aultman was not qualified
to give her expert opinion because she was not a board-certified pain
management physician and did not have her own specialty clinic like
defendants’.170 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.171 Citing a number of
opinions from the Eleventh and other circuits,172 the court observed that
a “proffered physician need not be a specialist in the particular medical
discipline to render expert testimony relating to that discipline.”173 In
this case, Dr. Aultman had a medical degree, completed a residency in
internal medicine, had practiced medicine for over twenty years, and
regularly prescribed pain medicine.174 At the time of the trial she was
practicing as a hospitalist, but she had also practiced general medicine
in a private clinic and palliative care in a hospice setting.175 Dr.
Aultman’s familiarity with prescribing opioids and treating chronic pain
therefore qualified her to opine on the defendants’ conduct, even though
she was not a pain management specialist.176
The court also gave weight to the defendants’ ability to question Dr.
Aultman in front of the jury.177 On cross-examination, the defendants
established that as a hospitalist, Dr. Aultman did not have her own
clinical practice and that when a patient “presented with a significant
amount of pain that was beyond [her] specialization, [she] referred that
patient to someone else.”178 The court therefore found no abuse of
discretion in the admission of Dr. Aultman as an expert, as “the weight
of her testimony was for the jury to evaluate.”179

Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1161–62.
171 Id. at 1161. Like a district court’s Daubert determination, “[a] district court’s
decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony will not be set aside” absent abuse
of discretion. Id.
172 See McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Gayton v.
McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2010); Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E.
Tenn., 388 F.3d 976, 979–80, 982 (6th Cir. 2004); Doe v. Biological, Inc., 971 F.2d 375, 385
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Viglia, 549 F.2d 335, 336–37 (5th Cir. 1977).
173 Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1162.
174 Id. at 1161–62.
175 Id. at 1162.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1163.
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B. Lay Witness Testimony
While Rule 702 is used to challenge an expert’s testimony, Rule 701
may be used to challenge the testimony of lay witnesses.180 Rule 701
requires that lay opinion testimony be “(1) rationally based on the
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”181
In addition, the lay witness’s opinion must be derived from her personal
knowledge or experience.182
There are generally two types of Rule 701 challenges: (1) a speculation
challenge, arguing that a witness lacks personal knowledge or
experience;183 or (2) an improper expert opinion challenge, arguing that
what is presented as “lay witness” testimony is actually a guise for expert
testimony.184 The first type of challenge is fairly straight forward as it
only requires determining whether the testimony was derived from
personal knowledge or speculation. For example, in Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County Florida,185 the
court allowed a property owner to testify about the impact that an
underground pipeline and permanent easement would have on the value
of the property, finding her testimony was based on her personal
knowledge, not speculation.186 Even though she had no prior experience
selling property encumbered by a pipeline, she had sold twenty-five
similar lots for rural residential development.187 Based on her
interactions with prospective purchasers, she believed “that a purchaser
who was buying a rural residential lot wanted to enjoy nature, have
privacy, and be free from restrictions governing what she could do with
her land.”188 Because the owner’s opinion was based on her personal
experience and knowledge, the court concluded that allowing her to
testify was not an abuse of discretion.189

See FED. R. EVID. 701.
Id.
182 Id. (see advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment).
183 See, e.g., Sabal Trail, 947 F.3d at 1368–69.
184 See Chalker, 966 F.3d at 1191–92; Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1298; McLellan, 958 F.3d at
1115; Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1270.
185 947 F.3d 1362 (11th Cir. 2020).
186 Id. at 1369–70.
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The second type of challenge is rooted in Rule 701(c),190 which states
that lay witness testimony must not be “based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”191 When faced
with such a challenge, the court must determine whether the testimony
sought to be admitted is based on personal experience or some form of
scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge.192 The distinction is
important because expert testimony, unlike lay witness testimony, has
disclosure and reporting requirements.193
The court confronted a Rule 701 improper expert opinion challenge in
four published opinions this term. In United States v. Estrada,194 the
court affirmed the lower court’s admission of testimony of an Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) agent and a State Department agent
about government policy relating to visa applications.195 Although these
specific agents had not personally handled the visa applications in
dispute, the court observed that “Rule 701 does not prohibit lay witnesses
from testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own
personal experiences.”196 The court then determined that their testimony
was not based on technical or specialized knowledge within the scope or
Rule 702 because the court limited the agents to testifying about “the
policies and practices of their employers.”197 The Advisory Committee
notes for Rule 701 explain that such testimony is admissible as lay
opinion testimony because it is “admitted not because of experience,
training[,] or specialized knowledge within the realm of an expert, but
because of the particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of
his or her position in the business.”198
In United States v. Chalker,199 the court allowed an FBI forensic
accountant to testify about the defendant’s bank and wage records as a
lay witness.200 The witness testified on direct examination that she had
“two bachelor’s degrees, one in business management” and “one in
accounting,” as well as a “master’s degree in forensic accounting.”201 She
also told the jury that she was a “certified public accountant, [a] certified
FED. R. EVID. 701(c).
Id.
192 Sabal Trial, 947 F.3d at 1368–69.
193 See McLellan, 958 F.3d at 1114.
194 969 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2020).
195 Id. at 1270–71.
196 Id. at 1271.
197 Id.
198 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 701, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment).
199 966 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2020).
200 Id. at 1191.
201 Id.
190
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fraud examiner and certified in financial forensics.”202 The defendant
objected to the testimony as “undisclosed expert testimony.”203 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed.204 Although the witness listed her
credentials, she never opined as an expert.205 She limited her testimony
to a summary of the defendant’s bank and wage records and at no point
opined about these records, much less about the defendant’s conduct in
the case.206
In United States v. McLellan,207 the defendant argued that the district
court improperly permitted an arresting officer to “testify as an expert on
the relationship between guns and drug activity.”208 At trial, the officer
was asked whether there is “a correlation between weapons and drugs,”
to which he responded “[y]es there is.”209 The officer then testified that it
was “‘very common’ for individuals involved in narcotic[s] . . . ‘to possess
handguns, a lot of times for protection’ because of the threat of ‘robbery
of their narcotics’ and the ‘sometimes large amounts of money they
possess as well.’”210 The defendant argued that this was improper expert
opinion, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.211 The court found that this
testimony “did not require any scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge, but was rationally based on his perception of the relationship
between guns and drug activity that he acquired during his time as a
police officer in the narcotics division.”212 The officer “merely offered his
view of the relationship between guns and drug activity; a view he
acquired from observations he made as a police officer, and one that did
not require any additional specialized skills or training to obtain.”213
Lastly, in Clotaire, discussed supra at Section II.A, the defendant took
issue with the testimony of an investigator with the Labor
Department.214 At trial, the investigator made statements “about the
difference between what one sees with the naked eye and what one sees
in a two-dimensional photograph.”215 The Eleventh Circuit determined
Id.
Id.
204 Id. at 1192.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 958 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2020).
208 Id. at 1113.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1113–14.
211 Id. at 1114.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1115.
214 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1298.
215 Id.
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that “[i]t does not take specialized expertise to understand that threedimensional objects may look different in person than in a
two-dimensional photograph.”216 Accordingly, the appellate court
affirmed, finding the district court did not err in allowing the investigator
to testify “to this basic point.”217
IV. OTHER RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Balancing Relevance and Unfair Prejudice
In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence consider all relevant
evidence admissible at trial.218 The Rules define relevant evidence
broadly as any evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”219 In its 2020 term,
the Eleventh Circuit addressed the extent to which a non-defendant’s
belief is relevant to the defendant’s. In United States v. Graham,220 the
IRS spent years trying to collect overdue taxes from the defendant,
Richard Graham.221 Graham eventually met a man named “Thomas
Walker, who claimed to specialize in ‘credit repair.’”222 “Walker told
Graham that he knew ‘some people’ who could ‘help use a bill of exchange’
to pay off his taxes . . . for the low price of $10,000.”223 After Graham paid
the fee, Walker connected him to two men who sent Graham a packet of
documents, one of which was a $3.6 million check titled “international
bill of exchange.”224 Walker and Graham delivered the documents to an
IRS building, after which an IRS employee grew skeptical of the bill of
exchange’s validity. Graham repeated this ruse three more times. The
international bills of exchange, however, were soon found to be
fraudulent.225
Graham was charged with one count of passing a fictitious financial
instrument and one count of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the
administration of the internal revenue laws.226 “At trial, Graham’s
counsel tried to ask Walker whether he believed that the international

Id.
Id.
218 FED. R. EVID. 402.
219 FED. R. EVID. 401.
220 981 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2020).
221 Id. at 1257.
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223 Id. at 1257–58.
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bills of exchange ‘were valid forms of payment for Mr. Graham’s
taxes.’”227 The district court sustained the government’s objection that
such testimony was irrelevant. On appeal, Graham argued that the
court’s exclusion of this testimony was clearly erroneous because “if
‘Walker believed the documents were valid,’ it would be ‘more likely that
Graham, too, believed the documents to be valid.’”228 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed, noting Graham presented no evidence that Walker
assured him of the instruments’ authenticity.229 Moreover, the court
observed that “[w]hat mattered at trial was what Graham knew and
thought”; “[w]hat Walker knew and thought had no bearing on Graham’s
own intent.”230 The court therefore found the testimony to be
irrelevant.231
Even if evidence is deemed relevant, Federal Rule of Evidence 403
allows courts to exclude relevant evidence where “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”232 The Eleventh Circuit has “long” said that Rule
403 “is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly” and
“the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence as unduly prejudicial is
narrowly circumscribed.”233 “Moreover, [i]n applying Rule 403, courts
must look at the evidence in a light most favorable to admission,
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial
impact.”234
Despite such a scrutinous legal standard, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 twice during this
term.235 In Estrada, discussed supra at Section III.B, the defendants—a
baseball trainer and a baseball manager—"partnered with business
professionals, human traffickers, and members of a Mexican criminal
organization to smuggle baseball players out of Cuba and into the United
States so that the players could enter into . . . ‘free agent’ contracts with
Major League Baseball teams.”236 At trial, the defendants attempted,
unsuccessfully, to introduce evidence “about baseball players who waited

Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1262.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 FED. R. EVID. 403; see also McLellan, 958 F.3d at 1115.
233 McGregor, 960 F.3d at 1324.
234 Id. (internal marks omitted).
235 See Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1273; Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. at 1121–22.
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to cross into the United States until they obtained their licenses and
visas,” thereby complying with the OFAC regulations.237 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that even if evidence that the defendants’
immigration attorney attempted to comply with OFAC regulations was
minimally relevant to the defendants’ willfulness to violate the law, “the
[district] court was permitted to exclude the evidence on the ground that
its potential for confusing the jury substantially outweighed any
probative value.”238 The appellate court reasoned that the lawyer’s
testimony would have been “particularly confusing” given that at no
point during the trial did the defendants pursue the theory that they
acted on the lawyer’s advice “in submitting documents with false
information to OFAC and the State Department.”239
In Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,240 the Eleventh Circuit again
affirmed the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403.241 In that case, the
plaintiff lost her husband to lung cancer and then sued the cigarette
manufacturing company under Florida’s wrongful death statute.242
Before trial, the plaintiff moved to exclude testimony about her
husband’s infidelity and the couple’s divorce and subsequent
remarriage.243 The defendant opposed the motion, arguing the evidence
was relevant to damages, addiction, and causation, and was necessary to
rebut the plaintiff’s testimony about the length of the marriage and how
long the decedent had smoked. The district court granted the widow’s
motion to exclude, finding: (1) the marital-discord evidence was
irrelevant having occurred so long ago; and (2) the evidence would be
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because it would cast the decedent in
a bad light.244
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that even if the evidence was
relevant, it would be unduly prejudicial.245 “[W]hat counts as the Rule
403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence . . . may be calculated by
comparing evidentiary alternatives.”246 In this case, the jury heard
evidence about the extent of the decedent’s alcohol abuse and the
negative impact the abuse had on his marriage. It heard he was a heavy
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drinker for four decades. It heard that he drank in the morning,
throughout the day, and sometimes all night.247 It heard that his
drinking caused “significant friction in his marriage,” and was a
“clinically significant disruption” in their relationship.248 The court found
that although the evidence “might have given the jury a fuller
understanding of the couple’s many years of life together . . . that does
not mean that the probative value . . . outweighed [the] prejudicial
impact.”249 The evidence the jury already heard about the decedent’s long
history of alcohol abuse and the negative impacts the abuse had on his
marriage diminished any probative value that the evidence of the
couple’s marital problems may have otherwise had.250
The Eleventh Circuit continued its trend of deferring to the district
court on Rule 403 rulings in three other published opinions this term.251
In Clotaire, discussed supra at Section II.A, the defendants attempted to
use intercepted preloaded debit cards at various banks. Thanks to
surveillance footage from these banks, the defendants were eventually
caught and charged with access device fraud, conspiracy to commit access
device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Because one of the
defendants presented a defense at trial based on a theory of mistaken
identity,252 the district court allowed the government to introduce the
defendant’s mug shot into evidence so the jury could compare the ATM
surveillance photos with a more contemporaneous photo of him.253
On appeal, the defendant argued that the introduction of the mug shot
evidence was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403.254 The Eleventh
Circuit began its discussion by “paus[ing] to appreciate the longstanding
judicial skepticism about the use of mug shots in criminal trials.”255 The
court further stated its belief that any such “skepticism is
appropriate.”256 But the Eleventh Circuit also observed that “mug shots
are not categorically barred” under its precedent.257 Rather, in United
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251 See Clotaire, 963 F.3d 1288; United States v. Hines, 955 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992);
McLellan, 958 F.3d 1110.
252 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1291–92.
253 Id. at 1299.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
247
248

2021]

EVIDENCE

1173

States v. Hines,258 the appellate court adopted a three-step inquiry.259
Under the Hines test, “introducing a defendant’s mug shot would be error
unless the government satisfied three prerequisites[:]”260 (1) “The
Government must have a demonstrable need to introduce the
photographs;” (2) “The photographs themselves, if shown to the jury,
must not imply that the defendant has a prior criminal record;” and (3)
“The manner of introduction at trial must be such that it does not draw
particular attention to the source or implications of the photographs.”261
Turning to the first Hines requirement, the Eleventh Circuit observed
in Clotaire that “demonstrable need” had not been defined with sufficient
precision.262 If “need” is shown by the importance of the defendant’s
identity, then the standard would be met.263 If, however, “need” implies
a lack of alternatives, then the standard would not be met.264 Looking to
its sister circuits for guidance,265 the Eleventh Circuit determined that
“the government meets its burden under the first requirement when
identification of the defendant is central to the government’s case.”266
Because the government’s case hinged on whether the defendant was the
man pictured in the ATM surveillance images, the court determined that
the first requirement was “easily met.”267
The Eleventh Circuit then turned to Hines’s second requirement: that
the photos cannot imply that the defendant has a prior criminal record.268
First, the court noted that the government and judge had informed the
jury that the photograph was taken on October 11, 2016—the day of the
defendant’s arrest.269 The court determined that this effectively removed
any implication of a prior arrest.270 The court then considered what steps
the government took to remove stigma. If, for example, the government
introduced “the characteristic ‘double-shot’ display—adjacent front and
profile photographs[,]” then “the inference of criminality [would be]
955 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1456.
260 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1299.
261 Hines, 955 F.2d at 1455–56.
262 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1299–1300.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 See United States v. Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d 1031, 1039 (5th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 215 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 495
(2d Cir. 1973).
266 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1300.
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‘natural, perhaps automatic’” given this display “is so familiar, from
‘wanted’ posters in the post office, motion pictures and television[.]”271
Here, however, the government introduced only the direct shot, not the
profile picture “so emblematic of a mug shot.”272 The government
additionally removed jailhouse administrative markings.273 Although the
photo showed the defendant in jailhouse clothes and its background
showed the height gauges,274 the court concluded that the mug shot still
satisfied Hines’s second requirement “because the jury had no reason to
suspect that the photo was taken from an earlier brush with the law.”275
The Eleventh Circuit found that the third Hines requirement was
likewise satisfied.276 It determined that the third requirement is
“[e]ssentially” that “counsel should not put on a show about the fact that
they are introducing a mug shot, or even have a dialogue with the court
about it in front of the jury.”277 The court observed that in this case, the
debate over the propriety of the mug shot took place away from the
jury.278 “Because of the care taken by the district court,” the court found
that the photo’s introduction satisfied the third prong.279 Taking all three
requirements into account, the court found that it was not error to admit
the defendant’s booking photo.280
In McLellan, discussed supra at Section III.B, the defendant was found
in his car in an area that was frequently used for illegal narcotics
transactions and dumping.281 As police officers approached the
defendant’s car, one officer noticed drug paraphernalia in plain view as
well as a “crystalline-type substance” on the defendant’s lap.282 The other
officer saw a firearm located on the center console of the car. The
defendant was charged with three counts of being a felon in possession of
a firearm.283 At trial, the district court allowed one of the arresting
officers to testify that he believed the defendant possessed a “sellable”

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
273 Id.
274 See, e.g., Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d at 1039 (criticizing visible measuring tape in mug
shot).
275 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1301.
276 Id. at 1301–02.
277 Id. at 1301.
278 Id. at 1302.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 McLellan, 958 F.3d at 1112.
282 Id.
283 Id. at 1112–13.
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amount of methamphetamines when he was arrested.284 On appeal, the
defendant argued that this testimony was unfairly prejudicial and
therefore should have been excluded under Rule 403.285 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed.286 First, the court observed that where a defendant
contests at trial whether he knowingly possessed a gun, “evidence of
possession of illegal drugs is relevant to determining whether a
defendant knowingly possessed a weapon found in close proximity to
drugs.”287 Moreover, because the defendant “contested the issue of
whether the amount of meth he possessed was sellable or solely for
personal use, the government was entitled to rebut [the defendant’s]
characterization.”288 Lastly, the court reasoned that there was other
evidence to support the inference that the amount was in fact “sellable,”
and therefore the arresting officer’s testimony was not unfairly
prejudicial. The court thus concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in permitting the arresting officer’s testimony.289
In United States v. McGregor,290 the Eleventh Circuit again admitted
evidence of contraband found at the site of an arrest.291 Police discovered
a gun and evidence of identity theft—personal identifying information
(PII)—while on a routine probation check of the defendant’s home. The
defendant pled guilty to possession as a convicted felon but proceeded to
trial on his other counts: possession of fifteen or more unauthorized
access devices and aggravated identity theft. The defendant objected to
the introduction of the firearm and several photographs of him holding
the firearm. He claimed they were unduly prejudicial in light of his guilty
plea for the firearm charge.292 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding
that the firearm “had substantial probative force” because the
defendant’s defense to the fraud charges was that he was in the wrong
place at the wrong time.293 “[T]hat his firearm was recovered from a small
closet with a sheet of PII—a sheet that also contained [the defendant’s]
fingerprints—was highly probative that the PII also belonged to [the
defendant].”294

Id. at 1115.
Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. (citation omitted).
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 960 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2020).
291 Id. at 1324.
292 Id. at 1321–1322.
293 Id. at 1325.
294 Id.
284
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B. Character Evidence
While Rule 403 gives district courts the discretionary power to
exclude prejudicial evidence, Rule 404(a)295 addresses a specific type of
potentially prejudicial evidence—character evidence—by prohibiting
evidence of a person’s character or character trait to “prove that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or
trait.”296 In criminal cases, the prohibition of character evidence cuts both
ways: the government is generally prohibited from introducing character
evidence to show that the defendant had the propensity to commit the
crime, and the defendant is barred from presenting evidence of good
conduct to negate the criminal intent.297 Rule 404(b)298 also prohibits
evidence of prior bad acts by prohibiting the admission of evidence of a
“crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character.”299
But, of course, there are exceptions to Rule 404(b)’s prohibition of
evidence of other wrongs. First, evidence of other wrongs is admissible
for other purposes, such as “proving motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.”300 The Eleventh Circuit found such an exception in Graham,
discussed supra at Section IV.A.301 There, the court allowed the
government to introduce a twelve-year-old misdemeanor conviction and
plea agreement for failing to file a tax return.302 The court found that this
misdemeanor went to show that the defendant had knowledge that the
documents he provided to the IRS were false, suggesting either “‘absence
of mistake’ or ‘lack of accident.’”303 The prior conviction was therefore
properly offered as Rule 404(b) evidence.304
Evidence of other wrongs also falls outside the scope of Rule 404(b),
making it independently admissible, if it is intrinsic evidence.305

FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
Id.
297 See, e.g. Graham, 981 F.3d at 1264 (finding district court acted properly in excluding
evidence of a good-faith attempt to cooperate with the IRS because “[e]vidence of good
conduct is not admissible to negate criminal intent”).
298 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
299 Id.
300 FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
301 Graham, 981 F.3d at 1264.
302 Id. at 1263–64.
303 Id. at 1264.
304 Id.
305 Joseph, 978 F.3d at 1263.
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“Evidence is intrinsic if it is: ‘(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of
the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2)
necessary to complete the store of the crime, or (3) inextricably
intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.’”306
Evidence is “inextricably intertwined” with “evidence of the charged
offense if it forms an ‘integral and natural part of the witness’s accounts
of the circumstances surrounding the offenses for which the defendant
was indicted.’”307
The Eleventh Circuit confronted intrinsic evidence twice in published
opinions this term.308 First, in Estrada, discussed supra at Sections III.B
and IV.A, the defendants filed two motions in limine before trial to
exclude evidence of violence, threats of violence, and smuggling. The
district court denied the motions, thereby allowing the government to
highlight numerous instances of violence and extortion at trial.309 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding it was
“intrinsic evidence necessary to complete the story of the crimes and
integral to the charged conspiracy.”310 The evidence was related to a
criminal organization that the defendants relied on to smuggle Cuban
players and their families into the United States through third
countries.311 Although the appellate court recognized that “some of the
evidence—such as testimony by a player’s wife that a handler threatened
to chop her husband into pieces—had the potential to elicit an emotional
response from the jury,” the court determined that the probative value
outweighed any prejudicial effect.312
In United States v. Joseph,313 the defendant was charged with four
counts of possessing and conspiring to possess heroin and fentanyl.314
During opening statements, the prosecutor mentioned that the defendant
rented his apartment using a stolen identity.315 On appeal, the defendant
argued that these statements warranted a mistrial because he was not
charged with an identity-theft crime, and therefore the evidence was
inadmissible under Rule 404(b).316 The Eleventh Circuit found that the

Id.; see also United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 2015).
Joseph, 978 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted).
308 Id.; Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1275.
309 Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1274–75.
310 Id. at 1275.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 978 F.3d 1251 (2020).
314 Id. at 1256.
315 Id. at 1259.
316 Id. at 1263.
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defendant’s use of the false identity was inextricably intertwined with
the narcotic offenses because he had used the false identity to rent the
property in which he stored the narcotics.317 The evidence established
that the defendant “leased the property and exercised dominion and
control over the drugs.”318 The evidence of identity theft was also: “(1)
relevant as a step [the defendant] took to conceal the criminal activity,
and (2) necessary to complete the story of how officers discovered [the
defendant] was renting the apartment and garage.”319 It is important to
note that in each of these cases addressing exceptions to Rule 404(b), the
court took notice of the curative effects of a jury instruction.320
C. Rule Against Hearsay
“The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit the admission of
hearsay statements at trial.”321 Rule 801322 defines hearsay as an out-ofcourt statement made for “the truth of the matter asserted.”323 But Rule
801(d)324 identifies certain types of statements “that are ‘not hearsay’ and
thus not prohibited by the hearsay rule[s].”325 Under Rule 801(d)(2)(B),326
a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a
statement on the subject; (D) was made by the party’s agent or
employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while

Id.
Id.
319 Id.
320 See, e.g., Graham, 981 F.3d at 1264 (“The district court provided the jury with a
limiting instruction—both when the evidence was introduced and in its final jury
instructions—clarifying that the evidence was admitted only to show intent, knowledge,
and absence of mistake, not ‘as any type of character evidence to show that he did something
before and he might do it again.’”); Joseph, 981 F.3d at 1264 (“Further, the district court
gave a limiting instruction about the identity-theft evidence: that [the defendant] ‘[was] on
trial only for the specific narcotics crimes charged in the indictment.’”); Estrada, 969 F.3d
at 1275 (“In any event, any prejudicial effect was addressed by the curative instruction to
the jury, which explained that the defendants’ association with unsavory characters was
not enough to prove their guilt.”).
321 Santos, 947 F.3d at 723.
322 FED. R. EVID. 801.
323 Id.; see also Santos, 947 F.3d at 723.
324 FED. R EVID. 801(d).
325 Santos, F.3d at 723.
326 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
317
318

2021]

EVIDENCE

1179

it existed; or (E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.327

When the statement is made directly by a defendant, Rule
801(d)(2)’s328 application is fairly straight forward.329 The analysis is
more complex, however, when the statement was made by a coconspirator. For a statement to qualify under the co-conspirator
exemption, “the government must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that: a conspiracy existed, the conspiracy included the declarant
and the defendant against whom the statement is offered, and the
declarant made the statement during the course of and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.”330 The Eleventh Circuit applies a “liberal standard in
determining whether a statement is made in furtherance of a
conspiracy.”331
During the 2020 term, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the coconspirator exemption in three published opinions this term, each time
reiterating the above-cited law [and affirming the admission of out-ofcourt statements under this exemption?].332 The court also considered the
issue of whether a co-conspirator’s declaration is admissible under Rule
801(d)(2) if he joins the conspiracy after the statement was made.333 In
United States v. Amede,334 the defendant argued that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting three recorded phone calls between his
unindicted co-conspirator and an undercover officer arranging a drug
transaction.335 The defendant argued “there was no evidence that he was
a member of the conspiracy at the time of the three recorded phone calls
because he was never named during those calls and was not yet known
to law enforcement.”336 The court rejected this argument, noting that “a
co-conspirator’s declaration made in the course and in furtherance of a
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
329 See, e.g., Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1150–52 (admitting prescriptions written by doctordefendants for controlled substances where they were written by defendants themselves).
330 Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1275–76.
331 Id. at 1276.
332 Amede, 977 F.3d at 1097–98; Estrada, 969 F.3d at 1275–76 (finding district court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony about phone conversation between several
men where declarant was a member of the conspiracy and his statements were made in
furtherance of the conspiracy); Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1150–51 (admitting prescriptions written
by defendants for controlled substances where they were written by defendants or a
co-conspirator).
333 Amede, 977 F.3d at 1097–98.
334 977 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 2020).
335 Id. at 1097.
336 Id.
327
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conspiracy is admissible against a co-conspirator, even one who may have
joined the conspiracy after the statement was made.”337 The defendant
did not deny that the statements were made during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.338 Therefore, even if the defendant did not
join the conspiracy until after the three phone calls were made, the court
concluded that the co-conspirator’s statements to the undercover cop
were still admissible against the defendant.339
Another exemption to the general prohibition against hearsay is an
adoptive admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B).340 To qualify as an adoptive
admission, the statement: “(1) must be such that an innocent defendant
would normally be induced to respond, and (2) there must be sufficient
foundational facts from which the jury could infer that the defendant
heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement.”341 The Eleventh
Circuit considered a statement’s admissibility under this exemption in
Santos, discussed supra at Section II.A.342 The issue before the court was
whether the officer’s red marks on the defendant’s Form N-400
Application constituted non-hearsay as an adopted statement by an
opposing party.343 As previously described, the defendant in Santos swore
under penalty of perjury that the contents of the Application, including
the officer’s annotations in red ink, were true and correct.344 Because the
defendant never disputed that his signature appeared on the annotated
form and did not raise any objection as to the authenticity of that
document, the court found that the defendant expressly adopted the
officer’s corrections by signing it and swearing under penalty of perjury
that the corrections were “true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge
and belief.”345 The court thus affirmed the district court’s decision to
admit the annotated Form N-400 Application a non-hearsay under Rule
801(d)(2)(B).346
Separate and distinct from Rule 801(d)’s exemptions to the prohibition
against hearsay are Rule 803’s347 exceptions to the rule against

Id. at 1097–98 (citing United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 503 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Id. at 1098.
339 Id.
340 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
341 Santos, 947 F.3d at 724 (citation omitted).
342 Id.
343 Id. at 723.
344 Id. at 717.
345 Id. at 724.
346 Id. at 725.
347 FED. R. EVID. 803.
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hearsay.348 For instance, Rule 803(6)349—otherwise known as the
business records exception—“provides an exception to the rule against
hearsay for a record made at or near the time of an act by a person with
knowledge if the record ‘was kept in the course of regularly conducted
activity of a business’ and ‘making the record was a regular practice of
the activity.’”350 In its 2020 term, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a
rental application and lease,351 still photos of ATM surveillance videos,352
and PDMP data and reports353 all qualified as business records under
Rule 803(6).
In United States v. Bates,354 the Eleventh Circuit also addressed the
“present sense impression” exception under Rule 803(1)355 and, under
Rule 803(2),356.the “excited utterance.”357 In Bates, a task force of federal
and state officers executed a warrant for the defendant’s arrest and a
search of his residence for drug-related offenses. When the police arrived
and commanded that he open the door, no one answered. The officers
began to ram the door, after which the defendant fired two gunshots
through the door, hitting one officer in the leg. The defendant then called
9-1-1 and told the operator that the police were at his door and to please
tell them not to shoot him. He also said he thought somebody was trying
to come in and that he hoped he didn’t shoot someone. The defendant
eventually opened the front door and was taken into custody.358 When
the officers took the defendant to a patrol car, he told a federal agent
“that he did not know the police were at his door and that he thought he
was being robbed.”359 The defendant was ultimately indicted on five
counts: assaulting a federal officer, discharging a firearm in relation to a
crime, possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, discharging a
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and knowingly possessing
a firearm as a convicted felon.360
The defendant argued before the Eleventh Circuit that the district
court abused its discretion by excluding his testimony regarding the
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
350 Joseph, 978 F.3d at 1265 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)).
351 Id.
352 Clotaire, 963 F.3d at 1294.
353 Ruan, 966 F.3d at 1151.
354 960 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020).
355 FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
356 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
357 Bates, 960 F.3d at 1291.
358 Id. at 1284.
359 Id.
360 Id.
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statement he made to the federal agent.361 The defendant contended the
statement was admissible under two exceptions to the rule against
hearsay: excited utterance and present sense impression.362 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s exclusion.363 First, it
determined that there was too large of a gap in time for the statement to
constitute an excited utterance.364 Under Rule 803(2), an excited
utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it
caused.”365 The court found that while the defendant was clearly in an
excited state during the 9-1-1 call, he made no similar statement while
speaking with the 9-1-1 operator, while being arrested, while being
calmed down after his arrest, or while being escorted to the patrol car.366
“By the time [the defendant] reached the patrol car and made this
statement, it is improbable that, as [the defendant] argued at trial, the
‘physical altercation as he [was] being arrested is what led to this
statement[.]’”367
The defendant also argued that his statement to the federal agent
qualified as a present sense impression.368 Under Rule 803(1), a present
sense impression is “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or
condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”369
Again, the Eleventh Circuit found the defendant’s arguments
unavailing.370 The court determined that the defendant’s “statement was
not a present sense impression because it was not ‘made while or
immediately after [he] perceived’ the event.”371 Put simply, the
defendant’s statement to the agent was just “too far removed to be a
present sense impression.”372
Lastly, in Mamani v. Sánchez Bustamante,373 the court, under Rule
803(8),374 addressed the public records exception.375 At dispute in this
Id. at 1287–88.
Id. at 1291.
363 Id.
364 Id.
365 FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
366 Bates, 960 F.3d at 1291.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 FED. R. EVID. 801(1).
370 Bates, 960 F.3d at 1291.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 968 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2020).
374 FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
375 Mamani, 968 F.3d at 1242–43.
361
362

2021]

EVIDENCE

1183

case were seven State Department cables that discussed the status of
Bolivian social unrest in October 2003.376 At trial, the plaintiffs argued
that the cables should have been excluded because they contained “highly
prejudicial second-level hearsay.”377 The defendants argued in response
that the cables were admissible under the public-records exception to the
rule against hearsay. The district court admitted the cables into evidence
at trial.378
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court
committed reversible error by admitting the State Department cables.379
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), “[a] record or statement of a
public office” is excepted from the rule against hearsay if the evidence
sets out “a matter observed while under a legal duty to report” or if it
contains “factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.”380
Under either exception, “the evidence is only admissible if the opponent
does not show that the source of information or other circumstances
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”381 The court reasoned that “[m]ost of
the information that buttresse[d] the State Department’s findings about
the events in Bolivia lack[ed] source attribution.”382 “The cables
repeatedly base[d] their findings on unidentified ‘reports’ or ‘sources.’”383
The defendants in Mamani cited two out-of-circuit opinions to argue
that the cables were admissible under Rule 803(8).384 But the Eleventh
Circuit court found neither persuasive, distinguishing them on their
facts.385 While recognizing that “[o]ther circuits ha[d] found State
Department reports about the conditions in other countries admissible
under the public-records exception[,]”386 the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that “considering the cables ‘even though they are hearsay’ is not the

Id. at 1240–41.
Id. at 1241. Under Rule 805, “[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule
against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the
rule.” FED. R. EVID. 805. Put another way, “[if] a statement contains multiple levels of
hearsay, each level must satisfy an exception to the hearsay rule.” ITW Food, 977 F.3d at
1348.
378 Id. at 1240–41.
379 Id. at 1241–42.
380 FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
381 Id.; see also Mamani, 968 F.3d at 1241.
382 Mamani, 968 F.3d at 1242.
383 Id. at 1243.
384 See United States v. Gluk, 831 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir. 2016); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Kirby Inland Marine, Inc. of Miss., 296 F.3d 671, 679 (8th Cir. 2002).
385 Mamani, 968 F.3d at 1243–44.
386 Id. at 1240 (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2004); Bridgeway
Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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standard in this Circuit”387 and therefore vacated the lower court’s
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.388

387
388

Mamani, 968 F.3d at 1244.
Id. at 1246.

